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Abstract
The Saudi Arabian Ministry of Health implemented a pro-active surveillance programme for Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS)
coronavirus (MERS-CoV). We report MERS-CoV data from 5065 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia individuals who were screened for MERS-CoV
over a 12-month period. From 1 October 2012 to 30 September 2013, demographic and clinical data were prospectively collected from all
laboratory forms received at the Saudi Arabian Virology reference laboratory. Data were analysed by referral type, age, gender, and MERS-
CoV real-time PCR test results. Five thousand and 65 individuals were screened for MER-CoV: hospitalized patients with suspected MERS-
CoV infection (n = 2908, 57.4%), healthcare worker (HCW) contacts (n = 1695; 33.5%), and family contacts of laboratory-conﬁrmed MERS
cases (n = 462; 9.1%). Eleven per cent of persons tested were children (<17 years of age). There were 108 cases (99 adults and nine
children) of MERS-CoV infection detected during the 12-month period (108/5065, 2% case detection rate). Of 108 cases, 45 were females
(six children and 39 adults) and 63 were males (three children and 60 adults). Of the 99 adults with MERS-CoV infection, 70 were
hospitalized patients, 19 were HCW contacts, and ten were family contacts. There were no signiﬁcant increases in MERS-CoV detection
rates over the 12-month period: 2.6% (19/731) in July 2013, 1.7% (19/1100) in August 2013, and 1.69% (21/1238) in September 2013. Male
patients had a signiﬁcantly higher MERS-CoV infection rate (63/2318, 2.7%) than females (45/2747, 1.6%) (p 0.013). MERS-CoV rates remain
at low levels, with no signiﬁcant increase over time. Pro-active surveillance for MERS-CoV in newly diagnosed patients and their contacts
will continue.
Keywords: Clinical, coronavirus, demographic, diagnosis, MERS-CoV, Middle East, real-time PCR, sample type, SARS, screening, viral load
Original Submission: 29 December 2013; Accepted: 17 January 2014
Editor: M. Drancourt
Article published online: 24 January 2014
Clin Microbiol Infect 2014; 20: 469–474
10.1111/1469-0691.12562
Corresponding author: Z. A. Memish, Collaborating Centre for
Mass Gathering Medicine, Ministry of Health, Al-Faisal University,
Riyadh 11176, Saudi Arabia
E-mail: zmemish@yahoo.com
†These authors contributed equally.
Introduction
Understanding the natural history, epidemiology and clinical
presentation of new killer infectious diseases is dependent on,
and inﬂuenced by, the WHO recommended surveillance
strategies for case detection, which largely focus on severe
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illness and microbiological testing, coupled with details from
case studies. Contact-tracing activities allow for the detection
of conﬁrmed cases with a broader spectrum of illness. For
infectious diseases caused by viruses, conﬁrmed cases include
only those with a positive PCR test result for viral genetic
material, in accordance with the laboratory guidelines. Since
the ﬁrst case report of the novel Middle East respiratory
syndrome (MERS) coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in September
2012 [1], the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) Ministry of
Health (KSA-MoH) has been working closely with interna-
tional collaborators and the WHO to better understand and
deﬁne the epidemiological, demographic, clinical and labora-
tory features of the new disease. A molecular real-time PCR
diagnostic test was rapidly developed after the ﬁrst case, and
was subsequently the method recommended by the WHO for
detecting the presence of the MERS-CoV infection [2,3]. This
test was used in a retrospective analysis on biobanked samples
to conﬁrm two cases of MERS from an earlier outbreak of
respiratory infection in Jordan in April, 2012 [4].
Important steps for the surveillance and control of MERS-
CoV infection are the early detection and isolation of patients
with active MERS-CoV disease, and screening of their contacts.
Surveillance studies also help in deﬁning and monitoring
transmission rates, case load, and epidemic risk assessment,
and assist in instituting infection control measures with new
diagnostic methods and treatments. Although MERS-CoV case
detection is critically dependent on the degree of awareness of
the attending physician, accurate laboratory testing is also
essential in making a diagnosis. Soon after the detection of the
ﬁrst case of MERS in Jeddah in September 2012 [1], the KSA-
MoH put in place a proactive surveillance and screening
programme for inpatients admitted with respiratory illness
suspected of being caused by MERS-CoV. It also included
active screening of contacts of conﬁrmed MERS cases. KSA-
MoH recommendations for MERS-CoV screening are based on
the WHO guidelines on case deﬁnition, detection, and contact
investigations [5–7]. This led to an increase in the numbers of
requests for MERS-CoV screening from hospitals throughout
the KSA. We report these laboratory data on the use of real-
time PCR tests on clinical samples received from 5065
individuals screened for MERS-CoV during a 12-month period,
commencing from the ﬁrst case detection in September 2012.
Methods
Selection of individuals for MERS-CoV screening
The KSA-MoH has implemented a pro-active early case
detection and surveillance system for MERS-CoV. It recom-
mends sending respiratory tract samples from critically ill
patients admitted to hospitals with fever and lower respiratory
tract infection symptoms. Screening for MERS-CoV is also
recommended for family and healthcare worker (HCW)
contacts of proven cases of MERS-CoV infection. All samples
are transported to and are processed by the KSA-MoH
virology laboratory in Jeddah, which is accredited and regu-
lated by the Central Board for Accreditation of Health Care
Institute. Quality assurance and control for all diagnostic tests
is monitored through Internal Policy Procedures and by
external quality assurance schemes.
Collection of clinical specimens
Respiratory specimens collected from patients and contacts
were: sputum samples; nose and throat (N + T) swabs;
nasopharyngeal (NP) swabs; and tracheal aspirate samples.
Sputum was collected directly into a sterile, leak-proof, screw-
capped sputum collection sterile container; NP swabs and
N + T swabs were collected with sterile synthetic tip Dacron
ﬂocked swabs. For NP specimens, the swabs were inserted
through the nostril, parallel to the palate, into the nasophar-
ynx. Swabs were left in place for a few seconds to absorb
secretions. For N + T swabs, both nostrils and the throat
were swabbed with separate swabs. All swabs were placed
immediately into sterile tubes containing 2–3 mL of viral
transport medium. For inpatients, lower respiratory tract
samples—2–3 mL of bronchoalveolar lavage ﬂuid and tracheal
aspirate—were obtained and placed into sterile, leak-proof,
screw-capped sterile dry containers.
Labelling, storage and transportation of specimens
When there were short periods of transportation (≤48 h) of
specimens to the laboratory, specimens were held in a refrig-
erator at 2–8°C rather than frozen; for periods exceeding 48 h,
specimens were shipped on dry ice at70°C as soon as possible
after collection. Each specimen container was labelled with the
patient’s ID number, the specimen type, and the date on which
the sample was collected. All specimens were pre-packed to
prevent breakage and spillage. Specimen containers were sealed
with paraﬁlm and placed in zip-lock bags. Absorbent material to
absorb the entire contents of the secondary container (con-
taining the primary container) was placed to separate the
primary containers (containing specimen) to prevent breakage.
RNA extraction
Extraction of RNA was performed with Roche MagNa Pure LC
(RNA Viral isolation Kit). Sputum samples were pretreated
with 2 9 lysis buffer for 30 min in a shaking incubator. Swabs
were placed in lysis buffer. Two hundred microlitres of each
sample was added to the MagNA Pure LC plate, which contains
96 wells. Reaction reagents were then loaded and checked,
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before the samples were run according to the manufacturer’s
instructions for nucleic acid extraction in the specimen area.
MERS-CoV screening test
A biosafety level 2 facility equipped with microbiological safety
cabinets was used for the handling of clinical specimens and for
extracting RNA for PCR. PCR is the recommended method
for detecting the virus. At least three sites in the genome of
MERS-CoV have been identiﬁed as suitable targets for the
diagnostic test—the upstream E protein gene (upE), open
reading frame (ORF) 1A, and ORF 1B—and sequences of the
speciﬁc primers have been published. Positive controls for the
upE screening and the ORF 1A conﬁrmation assays are
available. Clinical samples were screened by real-time PCR,
as previously described [6], with ampliﬁcation targeting both
upE and ORF 1A for conﬁrmation—these are standard assay
used in the KSA for MERS-CoV testing. The test result was
considered to be positive if both assays gave positive results. In
cases of discordance between the ﬁrst and second assays, or if
the result was considered to be a doubtful positive result,
another clinical sample was requested and analysed.
Data collection
Data from laboratory forms accompanying clinical samples
received at the KSA-MoH virology laboratory speciﬁcally
requesting MERS-CoV testing during the period 1 October
2012 to 30 September 2013 were collected and analysed.
Demographic and laboratory PCR test data and MERS-CoV
viral load data were recorded. Where data were missing from
the records or where clariﬁcation was required, data were
obtained through direct communication with attending physi-
cians and other healthcare providers.
Serological testing
No serological testing data were available, because there are
no validated accurate serological diagnostic tests for MERS-
CoV available to date.
Statistical analyses
Demographic, clinical and laboratory descriptive data were
tabulated. Univariate analysis was performed with binary
logistic regression analysis. A p-value of <0.05 was considered
to indicate statistical signiﬁcance.
Results
A total of 5065 individuals (625 children and 4440 adults) were
screened for MERS-CoV during the 12-month period:
hospitalized patients with suspected MERS-CoV infection
(n = 2908, 57.4%), HCW contacts (n = 1695; 33.5%), and
family contacts of laboratory-conﬁrmed MERS cases (n = 462;
9.1%) (Fig. 1). There were 108 cases (99 adults and nine
children) of MERS-CoV infection detected during the 12-
month period (108/5065, 2% case detection rate) (Table 1). Of
108 MERS cases, 45 were females (six children and 39 adults)
and 63 were males (three children and 60 adults). Of the 99
adults with MERS-CoV infection, 70 were hospitalized patients,
19 were HCW contacts, and ten were family contacts. Of the
nine children with MERS-CoV infection, two were hospitalized
patients and seven were family contacts. A signiﬁcant increase
in the number of screened and tested specimens was evident
over the study period (Fig. 2a), but there were no signiﬁcant
increases in MERS-CoV detection rates over the 12-month
period (Fig. 2b). The monthly case detection rates of MERS-
CoV were 2.6% (19/731) in July 2013, 1.7% (19/1100) in August
2013, and 1.69% (21/1238) in September 2013 (Fig. 2b). Male
patients had a signiﬁcantly higher MERS-CoV infection rate (63/
2318, 2.7%) than females (45/2747, 1.6%) (p 0.013) (Table 2).
Children
(< 17 years)
n = 9
HP = 2
HCW = n/a
FC = 7
PATIENTS AND CONTACTS SCREENED  
Total n = 5065
Children (<17 years) n = 625
Adults (≥17 years) n = 4440
MERS-CoV RT-Real-time
PCR-positive
n = 108
MERS-CoV Real-time
PCR-negative
n = 4957
Adults
(≥ 17 years)
n = 99
HP = 70
HCW = 19
FC = 10
Children
(< 17 years)
n = 616
HP = 459
HCW = n/a
FC = 157
Adults
(≥ 17 years)
n = 4341
HP = 2377
HCW = 1676
FC = 288
FIG. 1. Flow chart: screening of hospitalized patients and contacts.
FC, family contacts; HCW, healthcare workers and their contacts; HP,
hospital patients; NA, not applicable.
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Discussion
Since the ﬁrst KSA case report in September 2012, the KSA-
MoH has recommended mandatory testing for MERS-
CoV of all cases of respiratory illness requiring intensive-care
admission. This is the largest study describing the incidence
rates of MERS-CoV in the KSA over a period of 12 months.
The real-time PCR MERS-CoV diagnostic test has been in use
for detecting new MERS cases in hospitalized patients, and for
screening of HCW and family contacts of conﬁrmed MERS
cases [7–11]. Six months after MERS-CoV was discovered, at
the end of March 2013, there were only 17 MERS-CoV cases
reported globally, nine of which were from the KSA [12]. In
light of the infrequent, but continuing, detection of sporadic
MERS-CoV cases in the community and the hospital outbreak
at Al-Hasa [10], the WHO constituted an Emergency Com-
mittee under the International Health Regulations to advise
the Director-General on the status of the MERS-CoV situation
[13]. The important issue at that time was whether MERS-CoV
was going to progress to cause a major pandemic, as did the
SARS epidemic in the early 2000s, which was also caused by a
novel coronavirus, SARS-CoV [14].
Our results show that pro-active surveillance during the
months after the Al-Hasa outbreak, which occurred in April–
May 2013, showed no signiﬁcant increase in the MERS case
detection rates in the ensuing 8 months. The monthly positive
rates of MERS-CoV were 2.7% in July 2013 and then 1.7% in
August and September 2013. The initial increase in July 2013was
related to the intensiﬁcation of the surveillance of MERS-CoV in
the KSA following the healthcare-related outbreak at Al-Hasa
[10]. From our data, three areas of transmission can be focused
on for active surveillance and screening.
The ﬁrst pattern is the occurrence of sporadic cases in
communities. The true incidence of the disease in the
community is not known, and remains to be deﬁned through
case–control serological surveys when accurate, rapid, sensi-
tive and speciﬁc serological tests become available. In the
community, the asymptomatic cases or those with minimal
symptoms are difﬁcult to identify, and are usually missed.
Those who become acutely ill in the community present to
emergency rooms, where real-time PCR testing of respiratory
samples is performed.
The second pattern of transmission is transmission within
families [8]. The rate of intrafamilial transmission is not
known. Our results provide an estimate of a rate of 3.6% for
acquisition of MERS-CoV from close family contacts. How-
ever, this ﬁnding is not conclusive, as no serological assays
were utilized for screening mild or subclinical cases. How-
ever, the ﬁnding is in agreement with previous observations
of low secondary attack rates among family members or
contacts of patients in the KSA and European countries
[8,15–22].
TABLE 1. Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) screening by referral type and age group
Patients and contacts Children (aged <17 years) Adults (aged ≥17 years) All
MERS-CoV real-time PCR Positive Total % Positivea Positive Total % Positivea Positivea Total % Positivea
Hospital patients 2 461 0.43 70 2441 2.86 72 2908 2.51
HCW contacts NA NA NA 19 1695 1.12 19 1695 1.12
Family contacts 7 164 4.2 10 298 3.36 17 462 3.6
Total 9 625 1.4 99 4440 2.19 108 5065 2.1
HCW, healthcare worker; NA, not applicable.
For children: p-value for positive PCR in hospitalized patients vs. family contacts, 0.0021.
For adults: p-value for positive PCR in hospitalized patients vs. HCWs, 0.0029; p-value for hospitalized patients vs. family contacts, 0.46; p-value for HCWs vs. family contacts,
0.025.
aPercentage within each age group.
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FIG. 2. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Middle East respiratory syndrome
coronavirus case screening (a) and detection rates (b) over time.
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The third transmission pattern is nosocomial transmission
to HCWs. In one study, seven HCWs with MERS-CoV
infection were reported. Two of them were asymptomatic,
and ﬁve had mild upper respiratory tract symptoms [11]. The
current study sheds more light on the transmission of MERS-
CoV in healthcare setting. The positivity rate of MERS-CoV
by PCR was only 1.12% of all tested HCWs. Transmission
within healthcare settings was retrospectively reported from
Jordan [4], and then subsequently reported in France, the
KSA, the UK, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, and
included HCWs treating MERS-CoV patients [23–27]. These
data suggest that the current risk of transmission within
healthcare facilities remains small, and that the recommended
infection control measures are adequate [6,9,13,20].
Studies of family and hospital case clusters of MERS-CoV
infections in the KSA and other European countries that have
reported MERS cases indicate that a spectrum of clinical
illness occurs [7–9,15,16]. Reports from Tunisia and the UAE
of MERS-CoV infections occurring in siblings whose father’s
illness was a probable MERS-CoV infection case, and the case
from the UK [8,24,25], show that the siblings who are not
immunocompromised only manifest mild respiratory illnesses,
and do not require hospitalization. In the UK family cluster,
among 33 close contacts (20 household and 13 non-house-
hold), there were only two cases (6% attack rate) of
conﬁrmed MERS-CoV infection, one with mild illness and
one with severe illness [15]. There were no cases of MERS-
CoV infection among 59 HCWs who were in contact with
the index case without wearing full personal protective
equipment [15].
The fact that we have subsequently identiﬁed milder or
asymptomatic cases of MERS in HCWs, children and family
members of contacts of MERS cases indicates that the severe
cases represent only the tip of the iceberg, and there is a
spectrum of milder clinical disease that requires deﬁnition.
Our data indicate that MERS-CoV affects both genders, and,
although a few cases of MERS-CoV in children have been
detected, it remains mainly a disease of adults across all age
groups. To date, there is still no evidence of sustained
community transmission. Despite extensive investigation and
testing of thousands of contacts by the KSA-MoH, only a few
instances of transmission to HCWs or family contacts have
been identiﬁed. Almost all patients who died or who had
been hospitalized had severe disease or other comorbidities
[9,10]. The mortality rate and severity of disease are
exaggerated to some degree by the detection of such cases.
The case-fatality rate has fallen in recent months, owing to
the detection of milder and asymptomatic cases [23–27]. The
most critical characteristic of pandemic MERS-CoV strains
would be progression to efﬁcient human-to-human transmis-
sion. The number of sporadic MERS cases being reported has
been small, and indicates that the virus appears to be not
readily capable of rapid human-to-human transmission. Two
million pilgrims from over 180 countries, and 1 million local
KSA pilgrims, have very recently visited Makkah and Madinah,
KSA to perform the 2013 annual Hajj pilgrimage, and have
returned home after stays of between 2 and 8 weeks [28].
Millions of others will visit the KSA throughout the year for
the mini-pilgrimage UMRAH, and although MERS-CoV infec-
tion rates in the KSA remain at steady, low levels, and no
signiﬁcant increase in the incidence of MERS-CoV infection
over time is occurring, pro-active surveillance for MERS-CoV
in newly diagnosed patients and their contacts will continue.
The availability of more rapid and accurate serological tests
will help to better deﬁne the community prevalence of MERS-
CoV.
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TABLE 2. Distribution of all individuals screened by age, gender and Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV)
status
Children Adults
Number positive Total screened % Positive Number positive Total screened % Positive
Female
Family contacts 5 87 5.7 3 147 2.04
HCW contacts 0 0 – 15 1155 1.30
Patients 1 207 0.48 21 1151 1.82
Total 6 294 2 39 2453 1.59a
Males
Family contacts 2 77 2.5 7 151 4.64
HCW contacts 0 0 – 4 540 0.74
Patients 1 254 0.39 49 1296 3.78
Total 3 331 0.9 60 1987 3.02a
HCW, healthcare worker.
aMale patients had a signiﬁcantly higher positive rate for MERS-CoV than female patients (p 0.013).
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